The Fourth Campaign Our troops stopped their attacks after reaching the 37th Parallel (the Suwon Area). The enemy forces mounted their counter-attack in late January 1951, following their failure to lure our troops into the fortified zones along the Rakdong River. We fielded five armies against them. In this campaign, we wiped out nearly two divisions, which suffered about 2,000 casualties. Most of the enemy troops we annihilated were Syngman Rhee puppet troops, and the rest were mixed French, Belgian and Luxembourg units. The U.S. army lost only a little more than a battalion. But the enemy's counter-attack was repulsed.

In February or March 1951, I left Korea for Beijing (the round trip took seven days) to report to Chairman Mao on the situation on the Korean front and to ask him for strategic instruction. I explained to Chairman Mao that as the Korean War could not be won quickly, the 50th Army on the southern bank of the Hangang River should be withdrawn before February 15, 1951. The Chairman gave a clear instruction for conducting the War to Resist U.S. Aggression: "Win a quick victory if you can; if you can't, win a slow one." That is a clear and flexible principle.